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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this study is to demonstrate that African perceptions of donor agencies such 
as China may differ from country to country, and are informed by elements such as the country 
of origin, the knowledge base and orientation towards China. China has been a longstanding 
partner of Africa since time immemorial through series of trade and cultural exchanges. Using a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches to inquiry, we collect primary data via 
social survey using google forms with questionnaires administered to participants of ten (10) 
and six (6) tertiary institutions in Ghana and Togo respectively. This is to give voice to 
participants from Francophone and Anglophone speaking countries on the subject matter. We 
give more meaning to the survey data using documentary evidence. Evidence from our 
frequency distribution of the weighted responses on the various dimension of engagement and 
that of our phenomenology and narrative tools indicate that there are no singular overarching 
African perception of China as a donor agent; as the African continent is a 55-state region with 
diverse conflicting political, economic and socio-cultural proclivities. Africans have embraced 
China as an emerging force but unlike traditional multilateral bodies, China prefer to deal with 
Africa on an individual level without going public on matters relating to debt reliefs.  
 
Keywords: Multilateral Agency; Debt Reliefs; Sino-Africa Relations; Donor Agency; Foreign 
Policy; International Politics. 
 
1. Introduction 
Public health systems in Africa have witnessed pressure that is historically unparalleled 
amidst the Covid-19 pandemic. This phenomenon has trickled to other segment of the economy, 
giving an unstable outlook. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) had projected that growth 
in Africa will shrink to an all-time low (1.6%) in 2020 due to a severe disruption in economic 
activities and falling demand on export commodities (IMF, 2020). Working in anticipation of 
this instability, stakeholders such as the World Bank, IMF, sovereign governments and think 
tanks have collectively called for some form of assistance through debt reliefs and aids to 
accelerate post coronavirus recovery. This clarion call has indeed been heeded to and in the 
early part of 2020, the IMF approved a $500 million program that sought to cancel debt 
repayment for the next six months for 25 economies, with about 19 of them in Africa (Calvin-
Smith, 2020; Forson, Buracom, Baah-Ennumh, Chen, & Carsamer, 2015).  
It must however be emphasized that with this massive debt reliefs by players in the 
international community, failure to involve China could twat and truncate the benefit 
envisioned in conceptualizing such a relief program. This is against the backdrop that close to 
about 20% of all African governments’ debt is owed to China (see Jubilee Debt Campaign, 2018). 
All these issues feed into the longstanding debate about the ever growing and dominant 
influence of China on the African continent, remarkably among scholars of the West and of 
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China. Albeit the glaring facts of China’s numerous contributions to the development of African 
countries’ economies, there still remains a troubling suspicion of China’s real motives for 
engaging a whole continent. Hence the Chinese are inculpated as neocolonialists with the sole 
interest of milking the continent dry of its rich natural resources under the pretext of aiding its 
countries with their modernization and developmental projects and building their economies.  
In the recent past, African perceptions of China have mostly been defined in a collective and 
generalized manner which is erroneous given the fact that even though China may have the 
same guiding policy towards the whole continent, it surely does not engage every African 
country on the same level. African perceptions hence are varied and are dependent on 
individual country dynamics and their unique relations with China. Therefore, there can be no 
one African perception (Awoonor and Forson, 2020).  
In an opinion poll conducted by the Pew Research Centre in 2007, 10 African countries were 
surveyed on their perceptions of the World powers China and the US. Ghana, Kenya, and 
Uganda maintained a more positive perception of the US’ influence in Africa than of China, 
while the opinions of Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa revealed almost a tie between the US 
and China; with Senegal, Mali, and the Ivory Coast reserving a higher and more positive 
opinion of China’s influence than that of the US (PRC, 2007). In 2014, another research was 
conducted by the same institution. However, according to a more recent global Survey 
undertaken in 2014, China’s most ardent supporters were Africans and was explained by the 
report to be inspired by China’s economic engagements on the continent and its capacity of 
engaging all African countries with their different economic and political dispositions. The 
report also reiterated the fact that, despite the generally positive perceptions, China’s image is 
yet marred by its violations of labour rights, low engagement of local labour force and the lack 
of transparency with regards its issuance of loans to countries in the region; which is believed to 
be exchange waivers for the acquisition of natural resources. To buttress this reality, Ado and 
Su (2016) emphasized the fact that there is little empirical work done on the views of Africans 
regarding Chinese engagement with respective countries except for the very few opinion polls 
available. This called to attention the purpose of this study, as it reflects the need for more 
focused and country-specific studies in order to discard the misleading and stereotypical notion 
of “African perceptions” and pave the way for a more authentic discourse (Awoonor and 
Forson, 2020). 
The contribution of this paper is to demonstrate and bring to the fore the widespread 
Ghanaian and Togolese perceptions of China as a donor agent. Over the last 10 years, China has 
supported Africa through massive infrastructure development among other areas of 
engagement. This has improved the quality of livelihoods in Africa. These are often under-
reported by the western media and other ideological western-type development agency. The 
gap being filled by this study has important implications as the global audience tend to hear the 
African story from natives themselves other than westerners. This will also erase the erroneous 
perception that, the Sino-Africa relation is not a one-sided affair but elicit a win-win situation 
for both the giver and receiver.  
As of 2015, China's nominal GDP by Expenditure approach is 67.67 trillion Chinese Yuan 
($10.86 trillion US dollars). China's nominal GDP surpassed that of Italy in 2000, France in 2005, 
the United Kingdom in 2006 and that of Germany in 2007, before overtaking Japan in 2009, 
making China the world's second largest economy after the United States. But adjusting for 
purchasing power parity (PPP), China became the world's second largest economy as early as 
1999 overtaking Japan, and has recently toppled the US to become the biggest economy since 
2014 (Awoonor and Forson, 2020:3). As China’s economic power gains exponential and 
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geometric increase, so does its risk appetite and requirement for prospecting for raw materials 
in nether lands to the extent that China is the largest trading partner of multiple sub-Saharan 
countries in double-digit billion US Dollar values (Maswana, 2009). The ensuing situation in no 
uncertain terms has called for concerns among westerners and African indigenes particularly 
those in the diaspora regarding Chinese presence on the continent (McKinnon, 2010). Questions 
such as is China a goodwill partner or an imminent threat to Africa has become inevitable. 
What will be the impact of African perceptions of China on its international relation going 
forward into the future? What is the role of China in the Covid-19 pandemic economically? 
These and other questions are form the basis of this research. 
The study is organized as follows: we introduce the study in section one, with a motivation 
that warrant the present study. We review extant literature on the subject matter to identify 
gaps in empirical research and the theories that can drive our motivation from the introductory 
stage. Our methodology is explained in section three. We analyze and discuss our findings in 
section four. We conclude in section five with recommendation. 
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
 
2.1. Perception and Image Theory 
 
The psychological explanation for people’s behaviours is drawn from Sprout and Sprout 
(1965) human behaviour. Regarding international relations, it is explained that state behaviour 
is determined by two main conditions: First, it is dependent on the external dispositions of the 
system to which it belong, e.g. how power and authority are distributed in the system and how 
each state in the system is affect by these conditions; Second, state behaviour is dependent on 
the internal dispositions within the state itself. Perception studies arouse from the failure of 
rational theories to explain the reason behind state behaviour; as they centered only on physical 
determinants for the causes of war and or how they are resolved. Many scholars, leaning more 
on the neorealist side agree that, determining how a state will behave hence the motivations for 
going to war should not only be focused on the measure of power states wield and their 
capabilities but also on how the states perceive others’ power and capabilities; and what each 
state thinks are the motivations or reasons behind each other’s actions. 
However, perception in itself varies from country to country and even within countries. 
Richard Herrmann explains that the manner in which the US’ actions in Iraq were largely 
perceived by the outside world (France and Germany) as being motivated by the US’ selfish 
interests and the resolve to dominate the region while the internal or domestic American 
perceptions pointed to the belief that their country’s motivations for the War on Terror was 
driven by imminent security threat that Iraq posed at the time (Herrman, 2013). According to 
Herrmann, state behaviour relies heavily on how it perceives a given situation or how that 
situation in the form of a state perceives it. Thus the image of oneself, one’s image of the other 
and how one is perceived by the other (or how one portrays oneself to the other) is all crucial 
especially when it comes to decision making. Hermann focuses on the study of image as a tool 
for guiding the study of perceptions. Here, two core arguments are made: The first argument is 
on how relations are perceived or comprehended (i.e. the core motivations of states in a 
system), how they perceive and measure relative power and how they perceive each other’s 
status or position in the international system. The second is of the view that perceptions formed 
then becomes images of what the other is or represents, thus leading them to act either on the 
offensive or the defensive. The third argument views the image formed as the basis of 
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stereotypical labeling of the other on which their belief and understanding is oriented and 
based.  
 
2.2. Perception of Threat 
 
In the words of Herrman (2013), scholars have studied threat historically and world politics 
has revolved around different manifestations of threat, yet the core aspect of threat, that is, how 
threat is perceived or how it comes about did not receive much attention. Janice G. Stein looks 
at threat as a phenomenon that can be “verbal” and “physical.” Verbal threats become 
utterances tinged with conditions, thus having the capacity to incite the expected reaction or the 
capacity to exact repercussions in the case of the absence of compliance; and these are also 
referred to as, “Deterrence Threats” and “Compellent Threats.” However, threats are not only 
issued verbally. Examples of these are the withdrawal of consuls from a threatening country, 
the amassing of economic and military influence, and the strategic positioning of military 
personnel on frontiers of the threatening country among others.  
Further, threats are not necessarily understood and rightly interpreted, which is why there is 
the need for perception. Perception directs the determination of the threat with the use of the 
mental and sensory human faculties; and the ability to process and interpret what the threat 
means or represents. “Perception is the basis for understanding, learning and knowing, and the 
motivation for action (Herrman, 2013). Essentially, threat can be explained non-psychologically 
and psychologically. Non-psychological explanations of threat perception fall in line with the 
rationalist assumptions of threat perception which establishes that the cause of war or military 
engagement to be as a result of the misinterpretation of indicators and making of rush decision 
since there would be little incentive for the full-force engagement or aggression if states could 
accurately process and interpret their intelligence of each other, as this could assist in deterrence 
or prevent engagement in the first place. 
The psychological explanation of threat perception came about after the Iraq war where the 
rationalist i.e. non-psychological assumptions of threat perception were deemed insufficient 
and defective when it comes to decision-making. Herrman (2013) concluded that, the rationalist 
assumptions needed to be complemented by psychological models for a more complete and 
efficient method for threat perception in decision-making; particularly as the act of perceiving 
threat is affected by “cognitive biases.” He intimates the cause of the Iraq war to be due to the 
cognitive biases of both the US and Iraq which was informed by misapprehension, stereotypical 
profiling of each other, all based on old information and ignited by the failure to undertake 
deeper inquisition about each other; exactly what is represented by the other over time, 
disposition and strengths. According to Jervis (2008) in his compelling book (Perception and 
Misperception: New edition), the cause of the Iraq war was due to a severe case of exaggeration in 
US decision-makers’ threat perception, their conclusion and decision being guided by 
inadequate intelligence of exactly what is posed by Iraq. Conversely, the Iraqi leader at the time, 
Saddam Hussein’s belittling and underrating of US intentions and capabilities and resolve. 
Thus, both sides were erroneous in their strategies, due to the misperception of the other. 
Nonetheless, the fact still remained the lack of accurate measurement of information for the 
guidance of threat perception. Thus, scholars delve deeper into how to resolve the issue of 
miscalculation and misperception of threat. The psychological dispositions to threat such as 
fear, humiliation, the case of risk and loss aversion, all form bases on which threat is perceived 
hence action. Therefore, the need for the employment of both the non-psychological and the 
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psychological assumptions as a complementary model for effective threat perception becomes 
necessary. 
 
2.3 The China Threat Theory 
 
China with its significant economic development and the unprecedented growth of its 
political influence on the world stage can no longer be downplayed. From its more active role in 
the UN and the Asian region to its powerful presence on the African continent, hence the 
change in rhetoric of the world order being dominated by the western hemisphere; as it is 
evident China represents the catalyst of change in the world order that has since the end of the 
Cold War, been dominated by the Western hemisphere of the world, notably the United States 
of America. The China Threat Theory developed as a result of this conspicuous and imminent 
change; as China’s rise generated suspicion and fear perceptions detailing what its China’s 
motives are and how its rise would affect the existing world order. Many scholars wrote 
extensively on this phenomenon and its implications for the position of the existing Hegemon 
(Kang, 2005; Navarro, 2017; Wang, 2000). 
Thus the China Threat Theory looks at China’s rise in two perspectives: (1) how China 
constitutes threat to the existing hegemon that it seeks to replace, as an argument that leans 
towards the Realist position and (2) how China as a power would function in the global setting. 
It should be noted further that the Realist argument seeks to determine whether China’s 
behaviour constitutes a defensive or offensive one. However, it is evident that this claim with 
regards to China leans more towards the ideals of offensive realism.  Gilpin (1988) outlines 
several characteristics of a hegemonic challenger as the following: (1) a country that exudes 
considerable economic development, (2) a powerful military, (3) a substantial population and is 
significantly influential in many spheres and regions; and (4) also wields outstanding 
technological strength and most importantly, seeks to alter its existing position in the 
international system.  
According to Mearsheimer (2014), there are two elements that determine state behaviour in 
an international system. Firstly, that every state in an international system’s basic instinct is to 
survive as a natural conditioning as the international system is made up of several states with 
anarchic nature, seeking their own self-interests. It is this basic instinct of survival and the 
conditioning of the international system that determines each states action – “The structure of 
the international system which all states must deal with, largely shapes their foreign policy” 
(Forson, 2020; Mearsheimer, 2001; Navarro, 2017); thus the resort to acquire more power in 
order to either maintain their present position, if powerful or to amass wealth, military and 
influence for their elevation to a position of power, they are in a weaker position. Thus the sense 
of survival is the first priority of states in an international system. Secondly, when there exists 
the absence of a stable authority that wields ultimate power to implement statutes and make 
states abide by them; and to defend weaker states in the event of aggression or threat in the 
international system. Due to wariness and distrust among states towards each other, there is the 
lack of solidarity among states as they all wield the possible capability of change and 
malevolence at any given time. This lack of assurance or trust is still considered useless even 
with the existence of a credible and powerful authority in the international system, as states 
instead of reliance on the protection of the authority rather become apprehensive of their 
powerful position and of the power at their disposal. So paradoxically, the presence of a 
powerful state in an international system does not necessarily guarantee security and protection 
to weaker states due to the strengths and military capabilities of the powerful state. 
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2.3.1 Why China is viewed as a Hegemonic Challenger 
 
China’s economic exploits and international influence lends it to the resemblance of a 
challenge to 21st century world order and of our modern times. Drawing from Gilpin (2004)  
descriptions of the characteristics of a hegemonic challenger, the following reasons fall parallel: 
(1) Economic Power - It has maintained a study economic growth since its national economic 
revolution in the 1970s and has grown to economic prominence notably during the 2008 world 
economic crises; and became the second largest economy, only after the US, the current 
hegemon in 2009. At the rate of its growth, it was only a matter of time before it overtook the 
US’ economy, which has already occurred in 2015, making China the world’s largest economy 
currently (see Carter, 2014), (2) China has made great strides in the advancement of its military 
which is enabled by its economic abilities and technological advancement. It recently delivered 
a C28A Missile Corvette to Algiers (Lei, 2016). Also, its military influence is also spreading 
internationally, notably in other regions of the world like Africa as it is now a market for arms 
sales for militarization processes in various parts of that region, e.g. China engaged Robert 
Mugabe in a $240 million arms deal for Zimbabwe in 2004, it was the main supplier of arms to 
the Khartoum government in 2006 which aggravated the Darfur- South Sudan conflict, as 
reported by Amnesty International and the supplier of arms to the Nigerian government forces 
during the Niger Delta clashes between civilians and the Nigerian Military (Taylor, 2007), 
Additionally, China’s military gait is also recognizable on the international arena by the 
increase of its military personnel to the UN peace-keeping missions in some conflict –ridden 
regions in Africa (Xinhua, 2006). Nonetheless as reiterated by Deborah Brautigam in a response 
to a Norwegian Study on China’s arming of autocratic regimes on the continent, the US’s arms 
sales to the region far outweigh those of China (Jones, 2011), (3) As the US’ influence wanes in 
crucial regions of the world like the Middle East, so-called Rogue States like Russia, Libya, 
Zimbabwe, so-called Failed States but oil-rich countries like Sudan, Congo etc., comes a boost to 
China’s influence. China’s soft power tactics and foreign policy have given it precedence and 
favour worldwide. In terms of its influence on both the political and the economic levels, 
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s numerous state visits with its economic and political cooperation 
with states worldwide, sizable amounts of monetary aid and economic concessions to African 
countries, the spread of Chinese culture through the establishment of Confucius Institutes 
worldwide, its influence and leadership roles in the ASEAN region, its influence and leverage 
of its national interests.  
 
2.3.2 Soft Power 
 
The Soft power discourse was introduced by Joseph Nye in the 1980s but became widely 
recognized and popular in 2003 after the 9/11 terrorist attack on the US in 2001. Thence, it 
invoked attention as an essential tool for states’ relations with others in the international system. 
Nye defines soft power as the, ability of, “getting others to want the outcomes that you want” 
(Nye, 2005). This he reiterates as an effective tool for attracting and arousing the desire for 
cooperation of the intended target instead of the use of force, i.e. Hard power – “A country may 
obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries want to follow it, 
admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness” 
(Nye, 2005). Thus soft power relies on a state’s ability to direct the needs of other states 
according to its own political goals and ambitions. Essentially, there are various ways in which 
soft power is exerted: first, we must understand the fact that, soft power unlike hard power 
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which draws on military and economic capabilities is rather subtle and not necessarily physical 
assets. These assets can be political, ideological, artistic or cultural. To Nye, power does not 
necessarily only dwell on the use of persuasive tactics on the intended target but also should 
focus more on the ability to captivate, and ignite appeal from target states. When this is 
successful, then the resulting effect becomes complete accession and compliance to the state 
exerting the soft power. 
From Nye’s introduction of soft power in the 1990s, the discourse has gained increasing 
interest among various scholarly fields. Kurlantznick (2007) believes that, soft power is 
conceived as the idea that others will align themselves to you and your policy preferences 
because they are attracted to your political and social system, values and policies.” This can be 
said of the US for example as it has gained acceptance from many states and their civilians 
through the projection of its culture and values by the Hollywood films, and the projection of its 
democracy as an exemplary one worthy of emulation. Further, the exertion of soft power has 
changed faces over the years to incorporate the input of the media, international monetary, 
medical and humanitarian aid, scholarships and economic investments. This is emphasized by 
Kurlantzick (2007) whose observance of soft power centered more on aid and trade 
investments. 
Drawing from these studies, one is able to draw on two main mediums through which soft 
power is dispersed: First, by the efforts of a state, and second through the efforts of non-state 
agencies. The state medium bears on the use of strategies which are implemented through 
policies. Here, there is focus on both the use of diplomacy on the international level and on the 
domestic level. The agents of state-medium soft power are government agencies, NGOs etc. 
Additionally, international media agencies are also used by state governments as tools of 
exerting soft power. The second medium of exerting soft power bears on multinational 
cooperation, the initiatives of citizens, NGOs, can also promote effective dispersion of soft 
power. The activities of these agents, although are not affiliated to the state can indirectly 
generate the promotion of a good image of the state to target public or state. Mostly, the brand 
names, charitable initiatives, of these non-governmental agencies have long-lasting and positive 
effects on the people that totally surpass those initiatives orchestrated by government agencies. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Research Design 
 
To address the study focus, we employed a mixture of quantitative and qualitative 
research approaches. We collated the various responses from our participants and had 
them weighted to present numerical views on the various dimension of engagement. 
The other part of the study, which is qualitative positioned uses both phenomenology 
and narrative design type to inquiry. In the words of Creswell (2013), narrative has 
many forms and uses a variety of analytical practices and is rooted in different social 
and humanities disciplines. It encompasses the phenomenon being studied (e.g. illness, 
debt reliefs etc.), or the method used in a study, such as the procedures of analyzing 
stories told. This study resonates with the latter description of a narrative as a method 
in research, as it begins with the experiences as expressed in lived and told stories of an 
individual, a country or region. As rightly explained by Czarniawska (2004), narrative is 
a specific type of qualitative design in which it is understood as a spoken or written text 
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given account of an event/action or series of it. Phenomenology on the other hand 
describes the common meaning for several individuals of their lived experiences of a 
concept or a phenomenon. The authors of this study are Africans and therefore what is 
being told is their lived experiences through narrative. 
 
3.2 Sample Selection and Data Description 
 
With the help of social survey using google forms on questionnaires administered to 
participants of ten (10) and six (6) tertiary institutions in Ghana and Togo respectively. This 
allows the study to capture views from Anglophone and Francophone speaking countries. We 
bolster the primary data with documentary evidence to make meanings on the subject matter. 
We divided the study into two phases: (1) for the first round, 231 and 201 students were 
surveyed from Ghana and Togo respectively, (2) the second round captures the role of China on 
the global system economically through it involvement in debt relief initiatives and other form 
of assistance.  
The Likert scale question type was used in this section to present statements concerning the 
subject matter. A total of 10 statements were provided to participants using likert scale 
responses as: strongly disagree, disagree, indifferent, agree, and strongly agree (see Response 
Summary in Tables A1 and A2 in appendices). The demographic elements generated here 
included gender, age as well as field of study.  
An additional survey was conducted where the participants were allowed to provide YES or 
NO to some pertinent questions. In the first instance, 231 participants were asked whether or 
not they are interested in Chinese culture. 125 participants provided a YES answer whiles 105 
participants provided a NO answer. We had a participant who did not provide an answer to 
this question. Again, the same number of participants were asked whether they would like to 
study in China. There were 163 YES responses and 67 people responded NO to this question. 
The number of participants who did not provide an answer in this case was also 1. In addition 
to this, participants were asked whether Chinese-themed education is important in their 
country.  
 
4. Analysis and Discussion 
 
We discuss the most pressing question of the research paper that hinges on the perception of 
Africans on China as a donor agent. The overall responses of the research survey with insight 
from sections that borders on image as perceived by Africans themselves on China on pre-
identified dimension. Figure 1 and 2 collates the views expressed by Africans (Ghanaians and 
Togolese) of China focusing on various aspects of the Sino-Africa relations such as bilateral 
relations, socio-cultural, political, and socio-economic aspects. We then compare the weight of 
the responses that are in favour of China against the responses that denounce it, in order to 
decipher whether China is indeed a goodwill partner or a threat to Africa. 
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Figure 1. Perceptions of Ghanaians on Sino-Relation 
 
Source: Authors construct based on data from Survey 
 
Figure 2. Perceptions of Togolese on Sino-Relation 
 
Source: Authors construct based on data from Survey 
 
Impacts of African Perceptions of China on the International System 
Ghanaian and Togolese perceptions form part of the base of African perceptions, hence their 
importance. The impact of their various perceptions, either positive or negative would 
indirectly affect Chinese influence in their domestic domain, the ECOWAS region, the African 
continent and the world system. Therefore, the study identifies the economic implications of the 
African perceptions drawing on the Ghana-Togo experience, and its consequential effect for 
China and the global economies. 
Economically, positive perceptions of China may affect Western economies negatively. 
Although the Chinese economy is interconnected with western economies and the economies of 
other regions as promoted by the mechanisms of globalization, China’s own economic agenda, 
coupled with the positive perceptions it induces from other countries can invariably affect other 
economies. China has already attained the enviable position of Africa’s largest trading partner 
with an estimated total of $85 billion (2013). In spite of the fact that this position does not 
necessarily include first-hand access to the markets of every single African country, its 
successful economic engagement and the positive results it has yielded in the economies of its 
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African partners will serve as viable incentives for other countries to fully engage China trade-
wise. This would send a shock wave down the economies of the traditional trade partners of 
these countries, as they would potentially lose their trade positions over time to China as its 
economic influence expands across all the countries on the continent. 
China recently became Ghana’s largest trading partner in 2014, replacing the US who had 
held the position for many decades. It has since maintained this position as its current exports 
to Ghana stand at 32.6% in comparison to other notable exporters to Ghana such as Nigeria in 
second place with 14%, the Netherlands in third place with 5.5%, and the UK quite far behind at 
5.4%. Similarly, China is Togo’s largest trading partner with a 22% export volume barely 
surpassing that of Belgium at 20.3%, Netherlands at 11.9% and France at 6.6%. The implications 
of China’s takeover of Africa’s markets can be dire for other countries’ economic survival in the 
world economy. With these grave resources finding their way to China, it is believed that in no 
distant time, the world economy may have to rely on China for industrial outputs. As a result, 
China may dethrone the US as the world’s largest economy, being assured of improved growth 
potentials. Consequently, the Chinese economic wellbeing will greatly improve, and its poverty 
level shrink. 
Going forward, China’s own economic initiatives and engagements in the form of bilateral 
economic agreements and cooperation with various other regions around the world put it in a 
good position to either overtake the US’ economic influence around the world or rub shoulders 
with it. This can be drawn from China’s interest and engagement with countries, whatever their 
political disposition. For example, China is a dedicated trading partner of Zimbabwe and 
Angola, both of which are widely described as “rogue” states and dictatorships. 
In sum, China’s socialist economic market model could become the new benchmark for 
directing African countries and other countries’ economies, if proven effective; thus a possible 
change from the largely capitalist western economic models adopted by many countries due to 
US’ economic strength and influence, to the Chinese Model is imminent. China’s internalization 
of its currency, the Chinese Yuan, which is already being used officially and stored in bank 
reserves in parts of Africa such as, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Nigeria, Angola and Ghana will 
further consolidate China’s gains and influence in the international scene. In the year 2015, a 
momentous agreement was signed between China and Angola towards the regularization of 
reciprocal currency exchange of both the Chinese Yuan and the Angolan currency in order to 
mitigate against the frequent shortage of dollars for foreign exchange transactions in the 
Angolan economy. According to the predictions of John Casey, a financial expert for sub-
Saharan economic issues, Africa’s financial landscape is in the process of rapid change where 
the year 2016 would represent the era of the “solidification of the role of the Renminbi in 
Africa” as “the dollar dominance is no longer a certainty” in African economies. Another big 
move in this regard was 20 governors of the central banks of Eastern and Southern African 
Central Banks converging in Tanzania to deliberate on the acceptance of the Chinese Renminbi 
as their banks’ reserve, settlement and investment currency. As emphasized by the Governor of 
the Tanzania Central Bank, the banks buy more bonds from the Chinese banks due to their 
relatively higher profit level compared to European and US bonds (Awoonor and Forson, 
2020:17). On the current global health pandemic that has affected economies, China continue to 
play an indispensable role in the debt management situation of Africa. Touching on the regions’ 
indebtedness to China, the head of the Washington based Centre for Global Development 
(CGD), Mr. Masood Ahmed had observed that: 
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“…..Africa debt to China is $145 billion or so, over $8 billion of payments is required 
this year….so that needs to be looked at”. 
Stakeholders have warned that any attempt to seek for debt reliefs without necessarily 
involving China could lead to some struggles (Mukoya, 2020). A group of Finance ministers 
headed by Ghana’s Minister of Finance – Mr. Ken Ofori-Atta had called for a $100 billion in 
assistance for a moratorium on all external debts and eventual write-off amidst the pandemic. 
China as a goodwill multilateral agent heeded to this clarion call and had accordingly 
responded in the affirmative. At a daily press briefing after the call, the ministry of foreign affair 
led by Zhao Lijian gave assurance that: 
“China would communicate with relevant countries through diplomatic channels … 
for countries who face debt difficulties, China will never force them, but will resolve it 
through consultation via bilateral channels”. 
Unlike the IMF, China has not been able to come out with any concrete plan on its debt relief 
programs except for what the ministry of foreign affair had said at the early stages of the global 
health threat. Finance ministers in the region are beginning to be apprehensive and have thus 
called on Beijing to do more for Africa. According to Uganda Finance minister, the debt stock of 
Uganda was in excess of $80 billion in 2018 and a whooping third is owed to China (The 
Economic Times, 2020). In expressing worry over China’s continuous silence on debt relief to 
Africa, Mr. Matia Kasaija remarked that: 
“We have strong bilateral relations with China, but they haven't come to us saying 
anything”  
But many analysts believe China would have no option but to be forced into rare act of 
charity akin to the ones by traditional multilateral agencies like the IMF, World Bank and EU. 
An analyst with the Uganda-based group Leo Africa Institute have predicted that: 
“If there is a continental movement for debt relief, it would have no choice."   
  
The many calls on China to intervene is a manifestation of the rising shift in the global 
influence away from the West towards China. Therefore, China’s economic influence and 
dominance in Africa may not necessarily wreak complete havoc on Western economies, as they 
have economic stakes in other regions besides Africa. Nevertheless, as China’s economic 
influence grows simultaneously in these other regions as well, the West would increasingly 
have to cede their positions to the desirable and powerful player that China is. China, at this 
year’s FOCAC summit in Beijing had pledged support to Africa on debt cancellation. The much 
anticipated relief came in a pandemic summit addressed by the President of China. President Xi 
Jinping promised to delay loan repayment for 77 low-developing countries including those in 
Africa, as part of a G20 programme (Nyabiage, 2020). Speaking on debt relief, President Xi 
urged Chinese financial institutions to hold friendly consultations with African nations to work 
out arrangement for commercial loans with sovereign guarantees. Xi also said:  
"China will work with the UN, WHO and other partners to assist Africa's response 
to Covid-19, and do it in a way that respects the will of Africa," 
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In terms of political implication, China’s economic prosperity comes with recognition and 
respect on the world stage as its economic advancements would gradually translate to political 
influence; as this would be made possible by China’s capacity to exert its soft power 
simultaneously as its economic capacities increase. Chinese economic prosperity will 
undeniably enhance its military capabilities towards a possible overtake of the US’ making it 
the world’s strongest and largest military. In terms of arms trade, which is a very lucrative 
avenue of making economic gains, China would ungrudgingly replace the US in terms of this 
venture, as the largest and main supplier to the African continent. Also, China’s role on the 
multinational stage as the new player in terms of securitization in conflict-torn countries would 
increase. Furthermore, successful and sustainable development in African countries based on 
the Chinese Model and directive policy initiatives that is in support of every member state of 
the FOCAC, be it a so-called repressive government or democracy, is a great factor to China 
gaining political triumph in the international system. Sustainable development of states based 
on the Chinese developmental model for the continent would reveal it as the best and most 
plausible contribution to the continent’s overall development since independence from colonial 
rule; and would simultaneously disvalue the western models, and uphold China’s Model to the 
limelight in the areas of science and technology to develop (see Forson, 2019). 
Ultimately, African perceptions if generally positive and supportive of China would 
invariably translate to full political backing of China on the international stage, especially in 
terms of its “One China” policy and other stake-claiming issues of national interest in the 
international system. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
We have demonstrated in this study that, African perceptions of China as a donor agent 
differ from country to country. As clarified in the analysis and discussion of the subject matter, 
African perceptions are dependent on the dispositions and the dynamics of the circumstances 
surrounding the bilateral relations between China and its African partners. In the ensuing 
global health crisis that has had a negative consequence on developing economies, China has 
demonstrated to be a goodwill partner of Africa in managing the continent debt situation. 
Nearly close to about $ 8 billion in debt repayment for the year in question seem to be on hold 
amidst the Covid-19 shock wave on economies. This is something that will not go unrecognized 
by African governments on the continent should China come out with an explicit debt relief 
plan for the region. That notwithstanding, China’s long held foreign policy is to deal with 
countries on an individual basis as opposed to mainstream donor approach in which there is a 
blanket program for all. 
Yet, the activities of Chinese non-governmental actors, independent actors, and private 
investors have affected the efforts of the Central government in many African countries. In the 
case of Ghana, it has largely been the issue of Chinese illegal mining activities. Hess and Aidoo 
(2013) draws two important implications out of these illegal acts: (1) “…the saga of Chinese 
‘Galamsey’ has created an image problem for China …enables and encourages Sino-African pessimism”. 
This refers to the incitation of negative image of China, mostly as a neocolonialist and exploiter 
across national, regional and international spheres.  These clandestine activities also affect 
livelihoods and the developmental efforts underway by both sides. A vivid example is the 
abrupt cessation of work on the Bui Hydroelectric Dam by Chinese contractors funded by the 
Chinese government (see Aidoo, 2016; Baah-Ennumh, & Forson, 2017; Baah-Ennumh, Forson & 
Mmbali, 2020), (2) the deportation and apprehension of over 4,500 Chinese Galamsey operators 
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by the Ghanaian government in a bid to resolve the issue, from public outcry and pressure, 
resulted in strained diplomatic relations between the two sides (Xinhua, 2013). The Ghanaian 
government’s reinventing visa requirement for foreigners particularly Chinese nationals was 
also ascribed to the same situation and described as the government’s attempt to check on 
Chinese nationals desiring to enter the country (see Appiah, 2013). 
Togo on the other hand have had a totally different experience which is moderately less 
serious. Most of the issues involving negative reputation of Chinese in Togo have centered on 
the emergence of low quality and cheap Chinese-made African wax prints and textiles flooding 
the marketplace. The Chinese are copying the designs of the cloth, producing more cheaply, 
and selling cheaper. They are undercutting the market. A law was passed last year to restrict 
people who are wholesalers in waxed cloth from also retailing; a Decree has been issued but it 
has not yet been implemented…’(Lyons and Brown, 2010). Many of the problems have been 
associate with the fierce competition of Chinese-produced prints with locally manufactured 
ones that are usually costlier. Another source of negative perceptions regarding Chinese 
presence in Togo, which is parallel to the popular perception in many African countries is the 
low quality of Chinese goods found on the African market. Evidently, the effects of such 
perceptions generated by non-state actors, private investors and petty traders have been known 
to be the undertones of the prevalent negative perceptions of China that become 
overemphasized and generalized, hence overshadowing the positives associated with Chinese 
presence. A crucial determinant in these matters is how government and leaders of civil 
societies respond to these issue.  
China’s Soft Power policy is effective according to the positive perceptions of Africans. 
However, it is judicious to note that, even though several similarities can be drawn between 
some African countries (e.g. Ghana and Togo) in terms of positive perceptions, quite clear-cut 
distinctions are glaringly observable. For example, Awoonor and Forson (2020:19) did state that 
majority of Ghanaians and Togolese perceivers generally welcome China’s culture, education 
and initiatives; yet, it is worthy to note that, while a great number of Togolese would self-
sponsor their education in China (even though their economy is less developed compared to 
that of Ghana), majority of Ghanaians would only study in China if assured of sponsorship. 
This implies that, China’s efforts in Ghana’s education domain may not necessarily be yielding 
results of common benefit for China; rather, it may be engendering a case of dependency on 
Chinese aid, which would not benefit either sides.  
On the basis of the China threat theory, the study has observed that, China may lack the 
incentive to be aggressive towards the African continent. This is due to the image that it has 
projected of itself through its foreign policy towards the continent. In essence, from a political 
perspective, China’s presence and increasing influence on the continent can be understood as a 
bid to balance Western dominance in the region. From an economic perspective, China is in 
competition with the existing powers for the acquisition of energy resources and robust markets 
for its commodities.  
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APPENDICE 
 
Table A1. Ghanaian Perception  
Ghanaian Perception of China 
Response 
Type 
Number of 
Responses 
Q. Are you satisfied with current relation between 
China and Country SDA 12 
 
DA 30 
 
INDIF 39 
 
AG 128 
 
SAG 19 
 
Missing 3 
Q2. China is better Trade and development partner 
than the west SDA 11 
 
DA 36 
 
INDIF 46 
 
AG 112 
 
SAG 26 
 
Missing 0 
Q3. China-Africa relations is win-win affair SDA 22 
 
DA 60 
 
INDIF 56 
 
AG 75 
 
SAG 18 
 
Missing 0 
Q4. China can be a responsible superpower SDA 13 
 
DA 28 
 
INDIF 48 
 
AG 116 
 
SAG 26 
 
Missing 0 
Q5. China may be a Neocolonialist SDA 7 
 
DA 58 
 
INDIF 83 
 
AG 68 
 
SAG 15 
 
Missing 0 
Q6. China is Africa's political ally SDA 11 
 
DA 83 
 
INDIF 75 
 
AG 57 
 
SAG 5 
 
Missing 0 
Q7. China is best destination for higher education SDA 15 
 
DA 54 
 
INDIF 62 
 
AG 81 
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SAG 19 
 
Missing 0 
Q8. Chinese aid promotes corruption & impedes 
sustainable development SDA 18 
 
DA 74 
 
INDIF 69 
 
AG 61 
 
SAG 9 
 
Missing 0 
Q9. Sino-African contact solely economic-based 
relation & non-ideological SDA 11 
 
DA 47 
 
INDIF 66 
 
AG 97 
 
SAG 10 
 
Missing 0 
Q10. China offers good human resource development 
to Africa SDA 10 
 
DA 18 
 
INDIF 28 
 
AG 138 
 
SAG 36 
  Missing 1 
Source: Authors construct 
Note: SDA = STRONGLY DISAGREE, DA = DISAGREE, INDIF = INDIFFERENT, AG = 
AGREE, SAG = STRONGLY AGREE, MISSING = NO RESPONSE   
 
Table A2.Togolese Perception  
Togolese Perception of China 
Response 
Type 
Number of 
Responses 
Q1. Are you satisfied with current relation between 
China and Country 
SDA 26 
 
DA 8 
 
INDIF 48 
 
AG 85 
 
SAG 34 
 
Missing 0 
Q2. China is better Trade and development partner 
than the west 
SDA 16 
 
DA 8 
 
INDIF 37 
 
 
 
AG 100 
 
SAG 40 
 
Missing 0 
Q3. China-Africa relations is win-win affair SDA 38 
 
DA 19 
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INDIF 43 
 
AG 80 
 
SAG 21 
 
Missing 0 
Q4. China can be a responsible superpower SDA 12 
 
DA 33 
 
INDIF 31 
 
AG 81 
 
SAG 44 
 
Missing 0 
Q5. China may be a Neocolonialist SDA 44 
 
DA 38 
 
INDIF 43 
 
AG 56 
 
SAG 20 
 
Missing 0 
Q6. China is Africa's political ally SDA 46 
 
DA 39 
 
INDIF 64 
 
AG 40 
 
SAG 12 
 
Missing 0 
Q7. China is best destination for higher education SDA 29 
 
DA 48 
 
INDIF 40 
 
AG 51 
 
SAG 33 
 
Missing 0 
Q8. Chinese aid promotes corruption & impedes 
sustainable development 
SDA 30 
 
DA 23 
 
INDIF 50 
 
AG 86 
 
SAG 12 
 
Missing 0 
Q9. Sino-African contact solely economic-based 
relation & non-ideological 
SDA 27 
 
DA 34 
 
INDIF 35 
 
AG 70 
 
SAG 35 
 
Missing 0 
Q10. China offers good human resource 
development to Africa 
SDA 18 
 
DA 31 
 
INDIF 24 
 
AG 92 
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SAG 36 
  Missing 0 
Source: Authors construct 
Note: SDA = STRONGLY DISAGREE, DA = DISAGREE, INDIF = INDIFFERENT, AG = 
AGREE, SAG = STRONGLY AGREE, MISSING = NO RESPONSE   
 
